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 This paper explores how Knightian uncertainty affects dynamic properties in a model of 
economic growth.  The decision-making theory in the analysis is that of expected utility under a 
non-additive probability measure, that is, the Choquet expected utility model of preference.  We 
apply this decision theory to an overlapping-generations model where producers face 
uncertainty in their technologies.  When the producer has aversion to uncertainty, the firm’s 
profit function may not be differentiable.  The firm’s decision to invest and hire labor therefore 
becomes rigid for some measurable rage of real interest rate.  In the dynamic equilibrium, the 
existence of the firm level rigidity causes discontinuity in the wage function, which makes 
multiple equilibria more likely outcome under log utility and Cobb-Douglass production 
functions.  We show that even if aversion to uncertainty is small, “poverty trap” can arise for a 





Keywords: Knightian Uncertainty, Poverty Trap, Endogenous Cycles 
JEL Codes: E12, E32, E50 
 
                                                      
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the European Meeting of Econometric Society 
(Stockholm), Macro Workshop at Osaka University, and the International Nonlinear Science 
Conference in Crete.  I would like to thank Michele Boldrin (co-editor), Toshihiko Mukoyama, 
and participants at the conferences and the workshop for their useful comments.  This research 
is supported by Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research in Japan. 
** Mailing address: Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo Bunkyo-ku, 
Tokyo 113-0033, Japan.  e-mail address: sfukuda@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp 1. Introduction 
At the early stage of development, the degree of “uncertainty” in the economy is extremely 
large.  Several previous empirical studies reported enormous impacts of “uncertainty” on 
underdeveloped economies.
1  Under a large degree of “uncertainty”, it is almost impossible to 
assign subjective probabilities to each unknown events.  A distinction between quantifiable 
“risks” and unknown “uncertainty” is thus important in analyzing an engine of economic growth 
in underdeveloped economies. 
The purpose of this paper is to show that the existence of Knightian uncertainty makes 
“poverty trap” more likely outcome in a standard growth model.  A large number of previous 
theoretical studies constructed models of development traps based on multiple equilibria in 
physical capital accumulation (such as Barro and Becker [1989]; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 
[1989]; Becker, Murphy, and Tamura [1990]; Zilibotti [1995]; and Galor and Weil [1996]) or in 
human capital accumulation (such as Azariadis and Drazen [1990]; Tsiddon [1992]; Galor and 
Zeira [1993]; Durlauf [1993, 1996]; Bénabou [1996]; and Galor and Tsiddon [1997]).  Other 
models have shown various forms of indeterminacy in growth models (such as Benhabib and 
Farmer [1994]; Benhabib and Galí (1995); Evans, Honkapohja, and Romer [1998]) and growing 
through cycles (such as Matsuyama [1999, 2001]).  However, except for studies such as 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997), few studies attributed a source of the development traps to the 
existence of “risk” and “uncertainty” in less developed countries.
    
In the following analysis, we explore how Knightian uncertainty affects dynamic properties 
in a standard growth model.  The decision-making theory we use in the analysis is that of 
expected utility under a nonadditive probability measure, that is, the Choquet expected utility 
model of preference, developed by Gilboa (1987) and Schmeidler (1989).
2  We apply the 
Choquet expected decision theory to an overlapping-generations model with productive capital 
developed by Diamond (1965).  Throughout the paper, we assume log utility and Cobb-Douglas 
production functions.  The equilibrium dynamics thus leads to unique steady state equilibrium 
when producers have no aversion to Knightian uncertainty.  However, when the producer has 
aversion to Knightian uncertainty, the firm’s profit function may not be differentiable.  The 
firm’s decision to invest and hire labor therefore becomes rigid for some measurable range of 
real interest rate.  In the dynamic equilibrium, the rigidity is never observed.  The existence of 
                                                      
1 Some recent contributions on this topic are included in Collier and Pattillo eds. (2000). 
2 Based on the Gilboa-Schmeidler’s axioms, studies such as Dow and Werlang (1992), Epstein 
and Wang (1994), Hansen and Sargent (2000), and Mukerji and Tallon (2004) incorporate 
Knightian uncertainty in economic models. 
  1the firm level rigidity, however, causes a discontinuous jump in wages, which makes multiple 
steady state equilibria and development trap more likely outcome.  The discontinuous jump in 
wages reflects excessively low wages in underdeveloped economies.  In underdeveloped 
economies, capital stock is scarce and labor supply is abundant, so that a possible decline in 
marginal product of labor may cause a large reduction of output.  Entrepreneurs with uncertainty 
aversion therefore tend to reduce wage payments excessively, which in turn leads to excess 
decline of savings for future capital accumulation and may cause poverty traps.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 sets up our basic model and explains its information 
structure.  After formulating the expectations under Knightian uncertainty, section 3 shows the 
condition under which output rigidity exists for some measurable range of real interest rate.  
Section 4 elaborates the result by two special cases.  After explaining the consumer behavior 
and the dynamic equilibrium in section 5, section 6 investigates the steady state and its stability.  
Section 7 extends the model to the case where different parameter is uncertain and investigates 
its stability.  Section 8 summarizes our main results. 
 
2. The Structure of Production 
In the following analysis, we consider a competitive world where economic activity is 
performed over infinite discrete time.  The structure is based on an overlapping-generations 
model with productive capital developed by Diamond (1965).  There is a single final good, 
taken as a numeraire; it is competitively produced and can be either consumed or invested.  
Labor and capital are combined with a Cobb-Douglass technology in each firm.   
Denote output per worker of firm h in period t by yh,t and the input of capital per worker of 
firm h in period t by kh,t.  The production function of firm h is then specified as 
 
(1)  yh,t = δ kh,t
t h a ,      
     
where 0 < ah,t < 1 and δ  > 0.  
Until section 8, we assume that δ is common for all firms and constant over time.  We, 
however, introduce “uncertainty” in the parameter ah,t which is idiosyncratic across firms.  At 
the beginning of the period, the nature assigns ah,t to one of n specific values Aj’s (j = 1, 2, …, n) 
randomly, where 0 < A1 < A2 < …< An < 1.  Each stochastic parameter ah,t is independently 
identically distributed over time.  When deciding labor and capital inputs, each producer cannot 
observe the realized value of ah,t.  The producer thus faces “uncertainty” in its productivity when 
  2making production decision in each period.  We assume that there is no insurance market that 
removes the idiosyncratic “uncertainty”. 
The profit per worker of firm h in period t is equal to  
 
(2)  Π(kh,t) = δ kh,t
t h a , - Rt kh,t – wt,  
 
where Rt = real interest rate in period t and wt = real wage in period t.  Since the realized value of 
ah,t is unknown, the producer needs to maximize its “expected” profits.  
What makes the following analysis distinctive from standard profit maximization problem is 
that we characterize the profit maximization of the producer by the Choquet expectation (see 
Schmeidler (1989)).  Let Ω be a state space, and let Γ(Ω) denote the set of all subsets of Ω.  Then, 
a convex probability capacity (or a convex non-additive probability function) is defined as a 
function θ : Γ(Ω) → [0, 1] which satisfies θ(φ) = 0, θ(Ω) = 1, F ⊆ G ⇒ θ(F) ≤ θ(G) for all F, G 
⊆ Ω, and θ(F∪G) + θ(F∩G) ≥ θ(F) + θ(G) for all F, G ⊆ Ω. 
3  Suppose that π(α, k) be a profit 
function such that π (·, k) is Borel-measurable for all k ∈ ℜ and that π(α, ·) is a differentiable 
concave function for all α ∈ Ω.  Then, when θ is a convex probability capacity, the Choquet 
expected value of a random variable π(α, k) is defined by the following Choquet integral: 
 
  (3)  EQ π (α, k) ≡ ∫ π(α, k)θ(dα),  
                = ∫
+∞ ≥ 0 }) ) , ( ({ dy y k α π α θ + ∫ ∞ − ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − ≥ 0 1 }) ) , ( ({ dy y k α π α θ , 
 
whenever these integrals exist in the improper Riemann sense and are finite.  In particular, if Ω 
is a finite state space such that Ω = {}  and π (α, k): S x ℜ → ℜ n
i i 1 = α + is a profit function such 
that π (α1, k) ≥ π (α2, k) ≥ ···≥ π (αn, k) ≥ 0, it holds that 
 






i i i k k α θ α π α π =
−
= + ∪ − ∑ n, k). 
 
where n is the number of outcomes of α. 
                                                      
3 It is additive, and therefore a probability measure if the last inequality is always satisfied as 
equality. 
  3To distinguish it from standard expectation operator, we defined the Choquet expectation 
operator under Knightian uncertainty by EQ.
4  Having aversion to Knightian uncertainty, each 
producer chooses its capital per worker kh,t so as to maximize  
 
(5) EQ Π(kh,t) = EQ [δ kh,t
t h a , - Rt kh,t – wt], 
          = δ EQ kh,t
t h a , - Rt kh,t – wt. 
 
The expectations are based on information available at the beginning of each period.  Since both 
bond and labor markets are cleared before observing the realized value of ah,t, neither real 
interest rate Rt nor real wage wt is uncertain for the producer. 
 
3. The Profit Maximization under Knightian Uncertainty 
(i) The Case of Output Rigidity 
To the extent that the producer has aversion to Knightian uncertainty, EQΠ(kh,t) is not 
differentiable in kh,t.  It holds that 
 
(6)   
0 1 , ,
,
/ ) (
− = ∂ Π ∂
t h k t h t h Q k k E  =  ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ ∂ Π ∂ − −
− = 0 1 , ,
,
/ ) (
t h k t h t h Q k k E   
= - δ EQ(- ah,t) - Rt, 
and 
 
(7)   
0 1 , ,
,
/ ) (
+ = ∂ Π ∂
t h k t h t h Q k k E  =  ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ ∂ Π ∂
− = 0 1 , ,
,
/ ) (
t h k t h t h Q k k E   
= δ EQ ah,t - Rt. 
 
(see Appendix 1 for its proof).  We can then derive the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: EQΠ(kh,t) is maximized at kh,t  = 1 if and only if 
 
 (8)  δ EQ ah,t ≤ Rt ≤ - δ EQ (-ah,t). 
                                                      
4 We know that for two random variables π1 and π2, (i) π1 ≥ π2 ⇒ EQ π1 ≥ EQ π2 , (ii) EQ (π1 + π2) 
≥ EQ π1 +EQ π2, (iii)  - EQ (-π1) ≥ EQ π1, (iv) ∀λ ≥ 0 and ρ ∈ ℜ,, EQ (λπ1 + ρ) = λEQ π1 + ρ , and 
(v) if π1 is strictly concave in k, EQ π1 is strictly concave in k. 
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Proof. Because of (6) and (7), it holds that  ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ ∂ Π ∂
− = 0 1 , ,
,
/ ) (
t h k t h t h Q k k E  ≥ 0 and 
0 1 , ,
,
/ ) (
+ = ∂ Π ∂
t h k t h t h Q k k E ≤ 0 when (8) holds.  Since EQΠ(kh,t) is strictly concave in kh,t, this 
proves  the  proposition.       [Q.E.D.] 
 
   Figure 1-(1) depicts EQΠ(kh,t) when the condition (8) holds.  The function EQΠ(kh,t), which is 
not differentiable at kh,t = 1, is maxmized at kh,t = 1.  Since yh,t = δ when k h,t = 1, the profit 
maximizing output depends neither on parameter ah,t nor on real interest rate Rt when kh,t = 1.  
The above proposition therefore states that if (8) holds, the model can have “output rigidity” 
under Knightian uncertainty.  In the absence of Knightian uncertainty, EQ ah,t = - EQ (-ah,t), so 
that there exists no measurable range of kh,t that satisfies (8).  However, when the firm has 
aversion to Knightian uncertainty, - EQ (-ah,t) > E Q  ah,t.  Our model can thus have some 
measurable range of Rt that satisfies (8) under some circumstances.   
 
(ii) The Case when Output is not Rigid 
  When (8) does not hold, the profit maximizing output is no longer rigid in the sense that it is 
determined by relevant parameters and by real interest rate.  The determinants of kh,t, however, 
differ depending on whether kh,t is greater than 1 or less than 1.  From (4), it holds that  







i A  - kh,t
1 + i A )θ( A i
j 1 = U j) + kh,t
n A ] - Rt kh,t – wt,  when kh,t < 1, 
and  







i n A − +1  - kh,t
i n A − )θ( A i
j 1 = U n+1-j) + kh,t
1 A ] - Rt kh,t – wt,  when kh,t > 1, 
where θ is a convex probability capacity.  We can thus derive the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: When Rt > -δ EQ(-ah,t), the profit maximizing capital stock kh,t is less than 1 and 
satisfies  ∂EQΠ(kh,t)/∂kh,t = 0 in (9a).  On the other hand, when R t < δ E Q  ah,t, the profit 
maximizing capital stock kh,t is greater than 1 and satisfies ∂EQΠ(kh,t)/∂kh,t = 0 in (9b). 
 
Proof. Because of (9a) and (9b), it holds that  ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ ∂ Π ∂
− = 0 1 , ,
,
/ ) (
t h k t h t h Q k k E < 0 when Rt > -δ 
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0 1 , ,
,
/ ) (
+ = ∂ Π ∂
t h k t h t h Q k k E > 0 when Rt < δ EQ(ah,t).  Since both (9a) and (9b) are 
differentiable in kh,t, we obtain the proposition.    [Q.E.D.]  
 
 Figure 1-(2) depicts EQΠ(kh,t) when Rt > -δ EQ(-ah,t).  The function EQΠ(kh,t) is maximized at 
kh,t  = k* < 1.  It is noteworthy that the equilibrium capital stock per worker kh,t is identical for all 
firms.  This is because each firm is identical ex ante in the sense that it decides its capital stock 
and labor input before observing idiosyncratic shock ah,t. 
 
4. Two Special Cases 
(i) The Case of Two States of Nature 
 The decision theory can be formulated in a tractable form for the case of two states of nature, 
that is, when n = 2.  This corresponds to the case where parameter ah,t takes either A1 or A2, 
where 0 < A1 < A2 < 1.  Suppose that ah,t = A1 in state 1 and ah,t = A2 in state 2 where 0 < A1 < A2 
< 1.  Let S = {A1, A2}, and assume that θ({A1}) = θ({A2}) = ν ≤ 0.5, θ(φ) = 0, and θ(S) = 1, where 
θ is a convex probability capacity.  It is easy to see that θ is a probability measure when ν = 0.5.  
One can thus interpret that there exists Knightian uncertainty if and only if 0 ≤ ν < 0.5.  In 
particular, if we follow the definition of “uncertainty aversion” by Dow and Werlang (1992), we 
can see that uncertainty aversion is larger when ν is smaller. 
Since 1-A1 > 1-A2, (4) leads to 
 
(10a)  EQ (1- ah,t)  = ν (1-A1) + (1-ν)(1-A2), 
(10b)  EQ (-1+ah,t) = (1-ν) (1-A1) + ν (1-A2). 
 
The condition (8) is thus written as 
 
(11)  δ [(1-ν)A1 + νA2] ≤ Rt ≤ δ [ν A1 + (1-ν)(1-A2)]. 
 
From proposition 1, the profit maximizing capital stock per worker kh,t is independent of real 
shocks when the condition (11) holds.  The condition (11) is never satisfied when ν = 0.5, that is, 
when there exists no Knightian uncertainty.  However, to the extent that ν < 0.5, some algebraic 
arrangements verify that the condition (11) is satisfied for a measurable range of real interest 
rate, particularly when A2 is large or when ν is small.  
  6In the case of two states of nature, EQΠ(kh,t) is equal to  
 
(12a)   E QΠ(kh,t) = δ [ν kh,t
1 A + (1-ν) kh,t
2 A ] – Rt kh,t – wt  when kh,t < 1, 
and  
(12b)   EQΠ(kh,t) = δ [(1-ν) kh,t
1 A + ν kh,t
2 A ] – Rt kh,t – wt  when kh,t > 1, 
 
When kh,t ≠ 1, the profit maximizing capital stock per worker is thus obtained by differentiating 
one of these equations. 
 
(ii) The Case of Maxi-min Rule under Complete Ignorance 
   The maxi-min rule under complete ignorance proposed by Wald (1950) is a special case of the 
decision theory under Knightian uncertainty.  Under the Wald’s maxi-min rule, a person with 
extreme uncertainty aversion who is completely uninformed maximizes the payoff of the worst 
possible outcome.   
   Since 0 < A1 < A2 < …< An < 1, EQ ah,t = A1 and EQ (-ah,t) = -1/An under the Wald’s maxi-min 
rule.  The condition (8) is then written as 
 
(13)   δ A1 ≤ Rt ≤ δ An. 
 
Under the Wald’s maxi-min rule, EQΠ(kh,t) becomes 
 
  (14a)  Π
A(kh,t) ≡ δ kh,t
n A – Rt kh,t – wt  when kh,t  ≤ 1, 
  (14b)  Π
B(kh,t) ≡ δ kh,t
1 A – Rt kh,t – wt  when kh,t  > 1. 
 
We thus obtain the equilibrium capital stock per worker as 
 
  (15a)  kh,t = 1 when (13) holds,  
  (15b)  kh,t = (δ An/Rt)  when R
) 1 /( 1 n A −
t > δ An, 
  (15c)  kh,t = (δ A1/Rt)  when R
) 1 /( 1 1 A −
t < δ A1. 
 
Since 0 < A1 < An < 1, kh,t is less than one when Rt > δ An and is greater than one when Rt < δ A1. 
 
5. The Saving Behavior and the Equilibrium Dynamics 
  7  In our overlapping generations model, identical individuals are born in every period t.  For 
simplicity, population of individuals is assumed to be constant across generations.  Individuals 
live for two periods.  In the first they work and earn the competitive market wage wt, and in the 
second they retired.   Let c1t and c2t denote the consumption in period t of young and old 
individuals.  Individuals born in period t are characterized by the following intertemporal utility 
function 
 
 (16)  Ut = ln c1t + β ln c2t+1, 
 
where 0 < β  is the discount factor. 
Each individual supplies one unit of labor when he or she is young and divides the resulting 
labor income wt between first-period consumption c1t and saving st.  The saving consists of two 
types.  One is bond that earns risk-free return Rt+1 in the following period.  The other is stock that 
earns dividend and capital gain (or loss).  The returns from these two types of savings enable the 
cohort to consume during the retirement.  Suppose that ω is the share of risk-free bonds in the 
saving.  The intertemporal budget constraint is then written as 
 
 (17a)  c1t + st  = wt, 
 (17b)  c2t  = [(1+ Rt+1)ω +(1+ rt+1)(1-ω)] st, 
 
where rt+1 is returns for stock holdings from period t to t+1.   
  Since both bond and labor markets are cleared before observing the realized value of ah,t, the 
consumer faces any uncertainty neither in real interest rate Rt+1 nor in real wage wt.  Because of 
the law of large number, the consumer can also diversity idiosyncratic uncertainty in rt+1.  The 
arbitrage condition thus implies that Rt = rt for all t.  The consumer maximizes the intertemporal 
utility function (16) subject to the budget constraint (17a).  Assuming the interior solutions, the 
first-order conditions are 
 
 (18) st = [β/(1+β)]wt. 
 
Equation (18) denotes the saving function.  Because of log utility, the saving function is 
independent of the saving components and their rates of returns.   
Denote capital stock per worker in the economy in period t by kt.  Then, since the capital stock 
  8in period t+1 is the amount saved by young individuals in period t, it holds that kt+1 = st.  We can 
thus obtain 
 
 (19)  kt+1 = [β/(1+β)] wt. 
 
Equation (19) characterizes the equilibrium dynamics in our macroeconomic model.  Since 
capital and labor are competitively priced before observing the realized value of ah,t, the 
representative firm’s Choquet expected profit maximization determines the equilibrium value of 
Rt and wt.  Proposition 2 in section 3 suggests that when 0 < kt < 1 or kt > 1,  
 
 (20) Rt = δ ∂EQ kt
t h a , /∂kt, 
 (21) wt ≡ w(kt) = δ EQ kt
t h a , - kt δ ∂EQ kt
t h a , /∂kt. 
 
Proposition 1, in contrast, implies that when kt = 1, Rt satisfies the condition (8) and wt is 
determined by wt = EQ kt
t h a , - Rt kt. 
Since the definition (4) implies that 
 (22a)  EQ kt
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 (22b)  EQ kt
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 (22c)  EQ kt
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1 A    when kt > 1, 
where θ is a convex probability capacity, we therefore obtain 
 (23a)  wt = δ(1-A1) kt
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j j)]    when 0 ≤ kt < 1, 
 (23b)  δ [1+EQ (-ah,t)] ≤ wt ≤ δ (1-EQ ah,t)    when kt = 1, 
 (23c)  wt = δ(1-A1) kt
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j n+1-j)] + An.   
It is noteworthy that inequalities in (23b) provide a mirror image of Proposition 1.  They 
imply that k t remains to be one not only for a measurable range of Rt but also for a measurable 
range of wt in equilibrium.  From (23a,b,c), we can derive the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: The function w(kt) satisfies the following four properties.  
(I) w(kt) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in kt when 0 ≤ kt < 1. 
(II) w(kt) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in kt when kt > 1. 
(III) w(0) = 0, lim k→0 w’(kt) = + ∞, and lim k→+∞ w’(kt) = 0. 
(IV) lim k→1-0 w(kt) = δ [1+EQ (-ah,t)] < δ (1-EQ ah,t) = lim k→1+0 w(kt). 
 
Proof:  Since θ(A1) > 0, θ(An) > 0, θ( A i
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j n+1-j), we can derive (I), (II), and (III) from equations (23a) and 
(23c).  Moreover, equations (23a) and (23c) respectively lead to    
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j n+1-j)]  
      +δ (1-An)θ(An) = δ (1-EQ ah,t). 
 
This proves (IV) because -EQ (-ah,t) > EQ ah,t.    [Q.E.D.] 
 
  Among four properties in Proposition 3, (I), (II), and (III) hold true even when there exists no 
Knightian uncertainty.  However, unless there exists Knightian uncertainty, (IV) never holds 
because -EQ (-ah,t) = EQ ah,t when θ is a probability measure.  Figure 2 depicts the wage function 
w(kt) that satisfies four properties in Proposition 3.  Because of (IV), w(kt) is not continuous at kt 
= 1.  Around kt = 1, wages can be either low or high, depending on which side of the critical level 
  10one is coming from.  The lower wages when k t < 1 are the source of poverty traps in the 
following analysis. 
 
6. The Steady Sate and the Stability 
  Because of (I), (II), and (IV) in Proposition 3, the function w(kt) is well defined over all kt ≥ 0.  
The equilibrium dynamics of kt is thus described by the following one-dimensional map:   
 
 (24)  kt+1 = λ w(kt). 
 
where λ ≡ {β/[(1+n)(1+β)]}. 
Since w(kt) is piecewise continuous for all k t ≥ 0,  (III) in Proposition 3 implies that the 
one-dimensional map always has at least one positive steady state equilibrium k*.  However, 
because of (IV) in Proposition 3, the non-zero steady state equilibrium k* is not necessarily 
unique under Knightian uncertainty.  The following proposition holds.  
 
Proposition 4:  
(I) If lim k→1-0 w(kt) > 1/λ, there exists unique and globally stable k* such that k* > 1. 
(II) If lim k→1+0 w(kt) < 1/λ, there exists unique and globally stable k* such that k* < 1. 
(III) If lim k→1-0 w(kt) < 1/λ < lim k→1+0 w(kt), there exist three non-zero steady state equilibria k1*, 
1, and k2* such that 0 < k1* < 1 < k2*.  kt converges to k1* when 0 < kt < 1 and kt converges to k2* 
when kt > 1. The steady state equilibrium k* = 1 is locally unstable. 
 
Proof:  Using four properties in Proposition 3, we can show (I), (II), and (III) in the above 
proposition graphically.  First, Figure 3-(I) depicts the one-dimensional map for the case when 
lim k→1-0 w(kt) > 1/λ.  In the figure, the map never intersects the 45 degree line when 0 ≤ kt ≤ 1, 
while it has one intersection with the 45 degree line when kt > 1.  Since kt+1 > kt when kt < k* and 
kt+1 < kt  when kt > k*, the non-zero steady state equilibrium k* is globally stable in Figure 3-(I).  
This verifies (I) in Proposition 4. 
Figure 3-(II) depicts the one-dimensional map for the case when lim k→1+0 w(kt) < 1/λ.  
Equation (23c) implies that lim k→1+0 λ w’(kt) < 1 if lim k→1+0 λ w(kt) < 1, so that λ w(kt) < kt for 
all kt > 1.  Figure 3-(II) is thus the only possible map when lim k→1+0 w(kt) < 1/λ.  Noting that kt+1 
> kt  when kt < k* and kt+1 < kt  when kt > k*, the steady state k* is globally stable in Figure 3-(II).  
This verifies (II) in Proposition 4. 
  11   Finally, Figure 3-(III) depicts the one-dimensional map for the case when lim k→1-0 w(kt) < 1/λ 
< lim k→1+0 w(kt).  The map intersects the 45 degree line at  kt = k1* when 0 < kt < 1 and at  kt = k2* 
when kt > 1.  The map shows the existence of three non-zero steady state equilibria, k1*, 1, and 
k2* such that 0 < k1* < 1 < k2*.  It also implies that both of the steady states k1* and k2* are 
locally stable but that the steady state k* = 1 is locally unstable.  This verifies (III) in Proposition 
4 .          [ Q . E . D . ]  
 
  Proposition 4 has two noteworthy implications.  One is that output rigidity where kt = 1 is never 
observed in our dynamic equilibrium.  If lim k→1-0 w(kt) < 1/λ < lim k→1+0 w(kt), output rigidity 
arises only at a locally unstable steady state equilibrium.  In other cases, output rigidity can arise 
during the transition path but it is realized only for countable initial values.  The existence of 
unobservable output rigidity, however, causes a jump of real wage wt around k* = 1.  For 
example, if lim k→1-0 w(kt) > 1/λ, wt gradually increases to δ [1+EQ (-ah,t)] when kt < 1.  But when 
kt goes up beyond one, wt has a jump above δ [1-EQ ah,t], followed by another gradual increases 
towards the steady state k* > 1. 
  The other implication is that if lim k→1-0 w(kt) < 1/λ < lim k→1+0 w(kt), there exist two locally 
stable steady states.  The steady state equilibrium with high output arises only when the initial 
value of kt is greater than one.  In contrast, when the initial value of kt is less than one, “poverty 
trap” arises and the economy converges to the steady state equilibrium with low output in the 
long-run.  The general condition for which lim k→1-0 w(kt) < 1/λ < lim k→1+0 w(kt) is complicated.  
However, in the case of two-state nature discussed in section 4(i), lim k→1-0 w(kt) = δ [(1-A1)v + 
(1-A2)(1-v)] and lim k→1+0 w(kt) = δ [(1-A1)(1-v) + (1-A2)v].  It thus holds that lim k→1-0 w(kt) < 1/λ 
< lim k→1+0 w(kt) if and only if 
 
 (25)  (1-A1)v + (1-A2)(1-v) < 1/(λδ)  < (1-A1)(1-v) + (1-A2)v. 
  
When there exists no Knightian uncertainty (that is, when v = 0.5), the condition (25) never 
holds.  However, when v is small, the condition tends to hold for a wide set of parameter values.  
It is also noteworthy that even when v is close to 0.5, the condition can hold for some 
significantly large ranges of parameter values.  For example, assuming that A1 = 0.65, table 1 
reports the upper and lower values of λδ  that satisfy the condition (25) for alternative values of 
A2 and v.  The table reports that the difference between the upper and lower values can be 
significant for various combinations of A2 and v.  In particular, it shows that when the difference 
  12between A1 and A2 is large, the value of λδ can have sufficiently large variations even if v is 
close to 0.5.  The results imply that the condition (25) holds for a wide range of parameter values 
even if aversion to Knightian uncertainty is very small. 
Some economists may argue that the degree of Knightian uncertainty is, if any, very small and 
that the foundations of rational expectations still hold in macroeconomics approximately.  The 
above result suggests that this criticism is irrelevant in our model.  Because of the envelope 
theorem, the loss from output rigidity is a second order. Thus, even when v is close to 0.5, 
“poverty trap” can arise for some significant range of parameter values. 
 
7. The Case where the parameter δ is uncertain 
  Until the last section, we have considered the case where there exists “uncertainty” only in the 
parameter  ah,t.  The purpose of this section is to consider the dynamic properties in our 
overlapping generations model when the firm faces “uncertainty” in parameter δ.  Even when 
there exists “uncertainty” in δ, equation (24) still describes the equilibrium dynamics.  The 
properties of real wage wt, however, become different when δ is uncertain.  Denoting δ of firm h 
by δh,t, it holds that 
 
 (26)  wt ≡ w(kt) = EQ(δh,t kt
t h a , ) - kt ∂EQ(δh,t kt
t h a , )/∂kt. 
 
When there exists uncertainty only in δ h,t, the dynamic property is essentially the same as that 
in the standard overlapping generations model in the sense that it is globally stable.  However, 
when there exists uncertainty both in ah,t and δ h,t, the equilibrium dynamics becomes highly 
complicated in general.  For simplicity, the following analysis focuses on the case where each of 
ah,t and δ h,t takes one of two distinct values Ai and Dj (j = 1, 2) respectively, where 0 < A1 < A2 < 
1 and 0 < D1 < D2.  We assume that idiosyncratic shocks in ah,t and δ h,t are independently 
identically distributed over time.   
  Define κ0 ≡ (D1/D2)  and κ
) /( 1 1 2 A A −
1 ≡ (D2/D1) .  Then, we can show that real wage w
) /( 1 1 2 A A −
t ≡ 
w(kt) is determined by the following equations (see Appendix 2 for their derivations).  
 
 (27a) w(kt) = D1 (1-A2) kt
2 A (1-θ
1




+ D1 (1-A1) kt
1 A (θ({A1})-θ12) + D2 (1-A1) kt
1 A θ12   when 0 < kt < κ0, 
 (27b) w(kt) = D1 (1-A2) kt
2 A (1-θ
1




+ D2 (1-A2) kt
2 A (θ({δ2})-θ12) + D2 (1-A1) kt
1 A θ12   when κ0 < kt < 1, 
  13 (27c) w(kt) = D1 (1-A1) kt
1 A (1-θ
2




+ D2 (1-A1) kt
1 A (θ(δ2)-θ22) + D2 (1-A2) kt
2 A θ22  when 1 < kt < κ1, 
 (27d) w(kt) = D1 (1-A1) kt
1 A (1-θ
2




+ D1 (1-A2) kt
2 A (θ({A2})-θ22) + D2 (1-A2) kt
2 A θ22  when 0 < kt < κ0. 
 
where θ12 ≡ θ({A1, δ2}), θ22 ≡ θ({A2, δ2}), θ
1
22 ≡ θ({A1, δ1}∪{A1, δ2}∪{A2, δ2}), and θ
2
12 ≡ θ({A1, 
δ2}∪{A2, δ1}∪{A2, δ2}). 
We can easily see that the function w(kt) in each of the above equations is strictly increasing 
and strictly concave in kt.  We can also show that w(0) = 0, lim k→0 w’(kt) = + ∞, and lim k→+∞ 
w’(kt) = 0.  However, when there exists uncertainty both in ah,t and δ h,t, w(kt) is not necessarily 
increasing in kt.  It holds that 
 
 (28a) lim k→ 0 κ +0 w(kt) - lim k→ 0 κ -0 w(kt) = ψ0 (A2-A1)(θ
1
22-θ({A1})-θ({δ2})+θ12),   





12 +θ({δ2})) + δ2 (θ({δ2})-θ12-θ22)], 




where ψ0 ≡ δ1 kt
1 A = δ2 kt
2 A  and ψ1 ≡ δ2 kt
1 A = δ1 kt








22-θ({A1})-θ({δ2})+θ12 > 0, 
 
(II) lim k→1-0 w(kt) < lim k→1+0 w(kt), 
 




12 +θ({δ2})) + δ2 (θ({δ2})-θ12-θ22) > 0, 
 




12-θ({A2})-θ({δ2})+θ22 > 0. 
 
  14Proof:  Obvious because A2 > A1. [Q.E.D.] 
 
  All of the conditions (29a), (29b), and (29c) hold for a class of convex probability capacities.  
To see this, define probability measures for events {A1, δ1}, {A1, δ2}, {A2, δ1}, and {A2, δ2} by 
p11, p12, p21, and p22 respectively and assume that the events are independent, that is, p11 + p12 + 
p21 + p22 = 1.  Then, θ is a convex probability capacity if 
 
 θ ({A1, δ1}∪{A1, δ2}∪{A2, δ1}∪{A2, δ2}) ≡ (p11 + p12 + p21 + p22)
1+ε = 1,   θ (φ) = 0, 
θ ({A1, δ1}∪{A1, δ2}∪{A2, δ1}) ≡ (p11 + p12 + p21)
1+ε,    
θ ({A1, δ1}∪{A1, δ2}∪{A2, δ2}) ≡ (p11 + p12 + p22)
1+ε,    
θ ({A1, δ1}∪{A2, δ1}∪{A2, δ2}) ≡ (p11 + p21 + p22)
1+ε,    
θ ({A1, δ2}∪{A2, δ1}∪{A2, δ2}) ≡ (p12 + p21 + p22)
1+ε,    
θ ({A1, δ1}∪{A1, δ2}) ≡ (p11 + p12)
1+ε,   θ ({A1, δ1}∪{A2, δ1}) ≡ (p11 + p21)
1+ε,    
θ ({A1, δ1}∪{A2, δ2}) ≡ (p11 + p22)
1+ε,   θ ({A1, δ2}∪{A2, δ1}) ≡ (p12 + p21)
1+ε,    
θ ({A1, δ2}∪{A2, δ2}) ≡ (p11 + p22)
1+ε,   θ ({A2, δ1}∪{A2, δ2}) ≡ (p21 + p22)
1+ε,    
θ ({A1, δ1}) ≡ p11
1+ε,  θ ({A1, δ2}) ≡ p12
1+ε,  θ ({A2, δ1}) ≡ p21
1+ε,  θ ({A2, δ2}) ≡ p22
1+ε,    
 
when ε > 0.  We can show that all of the conditions (29a), (29b), and (29c) always hold for this 
convex probability capacity. 
Since w(kt) is piecewise continuous for all k t ≥ 0, the one-dimensional map always has a 
positive steady state equilibrium k* even when both ah,t and δ h,t  are uncertain.  The number of 
non-zero steady state equilibria and their stabilities, however, depend on parameters.  When all 
of the conditions (30a), (30b), and (30c) hold, the model has at least one locally stable non-zero 
steady state equilibrium.  For any parameters, kt converges to one of the stable non-zero steady 
state equilibria monotonically.  However, depending on parameters, the model can have four 
types of non-zero steady state equilibria: (A) one non-zero locally steady state equilibrium k*,  
(B) two locally stable steady state equilibria k 1* and k2* where k1* < k2*, and one locally 
unstable non-zero steady state equilibrium, (C) three locally stable steady state equilibria k1* , 
k2*, and k3* where k1* < k2* < k3*, and two locally unstable non-zero steady state equilibria, and 
(D) four locally stable steady state equilibria k1* , k2*, k3*, and k4* where k1* < k2* < k3* < k4*, 
and three locally unstable non-zero steady state equilibria. 
Each type can arise, depending on where the 45 degree line intersects with the curve of λ w(kt).  
Figure 4 depicts an example of the type (B).  It is easy to see that both k1* and k2* are locally 
  15stable because λ [∂w(kt)/ ∂ kt] < 1  around k1* and k2*.  The steady state with high output k2* 
arises only when the initial value of kt is greater than some threshold value.  When the initial 
value of kt is less than the threshold value, “poverty trap” arises and the economy converges to 
the steady state with low output k1*. 
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we explored how Knightian uncertainty affects dynamic properties of a standard 
growth model.  We applied the Choquet expected decision theory to an overlapping-generations 
model where firms face uncertainty in technologies.  To the extent that the firm has aversion to 
Knightian uncertainty, the firm’s decision becomes rigidity for a significant range of real 
interest rate.  The existence of the firm level rigidity causes a significant discontinuity of real 
wage wt around k* = 1.  As a result, there exist multiple locally stable steady states under some 
parameters even if aversion to Knightian uncertainty is very small.  When the initial value of kt 
is small, “poverty trap” arises and the economy converges to the steady state equilibrium with 
low output in the long-run.  Solving “uncertainty” is a critical problem at the early stage of 
development. 
  16Appendix 1: Derivations of (6) and (7)  
 
This appendix derives (6) and (7) in section 2 by using the following lemma. 
   
Lemma:  Suppose that for all α ∈ Ω, a profit function π(α, k), which is concave in k, is 




/ ) , (
− =
∂ ∂
k k Q k k E α π  =  ) / ) , ( (
0 k k Q k k E = ∂ ∂ − − α π , 
(A2) 
0 0
/ ) , (
+ =
∂ ∂
k k Q k k E α π  =  ) / ) , ( (
0 k k Q k k E = ∂ ∂ α π . 
 
Proof.  Suppose that π (α1, X) = π (α2, X) = ··· = π (αn, X) when k = k0, where n is the number of 
outcomes of α.  Since π (α, k) is a concave function in k, we can  then suppose that π (α1, k) ≥ π 
(α2, k) ≥ ··· ≥ π (αn, k) ≥ 0 when k = k0+0 and that π (α1, k) ≤ π (α2, k) ≤ ···≤ π (αn, k) ≤ 0 when k 
= k0-0 without loss of generality.  In this case, it holds that ∂π (α1, k)/∂k ≥ ∂π (α2, k)/∂k ≥ ··· ≥ ∂π 
(αn, k)/∂k ≥ 0 when k = k0+0.  Therefore, the definition of the Choquet expectation, that is (4) in 
section 2, implies that  
0 0
/ ) , (
+ =
∂ ∂
k k Q k k E α π  =  ) / ) , ( (
0 k k Q k k E = ∂ ∂ α π . 
Similarly, it holds that 0 ≤ ∂π (α1, k)/∂k ≤ ∂π (α2, k)/∂k ≤ ··· ≤ ∂π (αn, k)/∂k when k = k0-0.  The 
definition (14) thus implies that  
0 0
/ ) , (
− =
∂ ∂
k k Q k k E α π  =  ) / ) , ( (
0 k k Q k k E = ∂ ∂ − − α π . 
This proves the lemma.  [Q.E.D.] 
 
Applying this lemma to equation (2), we obtain (6) and (7) in section 2. 
 
 
Appendix 2: Derivations of real wage in section 7 
 
  Since κ0 ≡ (D1/D2)  and κ
) /( 1 1 2 A A −
1 ≡ (D2/D1) , it holds that 
) /( 1 1 2 A A −
 
  17D1 kt
2 A < D2 kt
2 A < D1 kt
1 A < D2 kt
1 A  when 0 < kt < κ0, 
D1 kt
2 A < D1 kt
1 A < D2 kt
2 A < D2 kt
1 A  when κ0 < kt < 1, 
D1 kt
1 A < D1 kt
2 A < D2 kt
1 A < D2 kt
2 A   when 1 < kt < κ1, 
D1 kt
1 A < D2 kt
1 A < D1 kt
2 A < D2 kt
2 A  when 0 < kt < κ0. 
 
Equation (4) thus leads to  
 
EQ(δ kt
a) = D1 kt
2 A (1-θ
1





1 A (θ(A1)-θ12) + D2 kt
1 A θ12   when 0 < kt < κ0, 
EQ(δ kt
a) = D1 kt
2 A (1-θ
1





2 A (θ(δ2)-θ12) + D2 kt
1 A θ12   when κ0 < kt < 1, 
EQ(δ kt
a) = D1 kt
1 A (1-θ
2





1 A (θ(δ2)-θ22) + D2 kt
2 A θ22  when 1 < kt < κ1, 
EQ(δ kt
a) = D1 kt
1 A (1-θ
2





2 A (θ(A2)-θ22) + D2 kt
2 A θ22  when 0 < kt < κ0. 
 
where θ12 ≡ θ({A1, δ2}), θ22 ≡ θ({A2, δ2}), θ
1
22 ≡ θ({A1, δ1}∪{A1, δ2}∪{A2, δ2}), and θ
2
12 ≡ θ({A1, 
δ2}∪{A2, δ1}∪{A2, δ2}).  Since wt = EQ(δ kt
a) - kt ∂EQ(δ kt
a)/∂kt, these equations lead to real 
wages in section 8. 
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